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In  spite  of  enormous economic and political  changes  over  the last  decades,  landed elites  in
Pakistan’s northern Punjab continue to hold control over the rural masses. They can do this
because they were able to benefit disproportionately from the modernisation of agriculture (for
instance, through the green revolution) to strengthen their economic hold over the poor. They
adapted to the democratisation of political processes (for instance, the holding of elections) by
skilfully strengthening their control over the state apparatus and its service provision at the local
level. As a result, the rural masses continue to depend on the landed elite for their livelihoods,
including  employment,  and  for  access  to  state  services.  Helping  the  poor  improve  their
livelihoods would thus require politicians and public servants who do not regard the state to be
an  “instrument  for  landlord  domination”  (p.  46),  but  who  follow  programmatic  politics
accountable to the people.
This, in short, is what I read as the core message of this thought-provoking book by Nicolas
Martin. Its insights are based on his extended fieldwork in a village north of Lahore around
2005.  The  book,  though,  is  not  a  classical  “village  study.”  Rather,  the  village  provided  the
author “with a place to explore broader political issues” (p. 16). These broader issues include
the  persistence  of  inequality  and  the  inability  of  “democracy”  to  break  up  the  relations  of
dependencies  that  reproduce  inequalities.  To  illustrate  such  broader  issues,  I  refer  to  land
reform, seen by many as an important component of re-arranging rural power relations. The
details compiled in Table 1 illustrate that very little land was resumed under land reform laws.
In addition, these figures and the official number of beneficiaries are contested. Some authors
argue that while a small part of the resumed land was sold or distributed to tenants and small
owners,  a  large  part  (especially  from the  1959  reforms)  was  auctioned  to  rich  farmers  and
members of the military and bureaucracy. On top of that, landlords distributed their land among
family members to escape land reforms.
Tablle  1 A quick glance at land reform in Pakistan
Authority Planned ceilings Outcomes
1945–55
(1)
First government committees on
land and tenancy reforms
Nil
1959 (1) Military regime under Ayub Khan 500 acres irrigated, 1000 acres un-
irrigated (plus many possibilities for
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Authority Planned ceilings Outcomes
exceptions)
1972 (1) Under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 150 acres irrigated, 300 acres un-
irrigated
0.48 million ha resumed
1977 (1) Under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 100 acres irrigated, 200 acres un-
irrigated
n.a.*
1990 (5) Shariat Appellate Bench of the
Supreme Court (during Benazir
Bhutto’s government)
Declared land reforms as being




Total Total farm land (2000): approximately 50 million ha (2) Resumed: 1.52 million ha,
distributed: 1.31 million
ha (4)***
Total number of farms: 8.26 million (3)** Persons benefitted: 0.26
million (4)
Notes: *Shortly after the parliament had passed this bill, Bhutto was ousted by General M. Zia-ul-Haq;
**Details are: owners 6.74 million, owner-cum-tenants 0.6 million, tenants 0.92 million (source 2); *** These
data refer to resumed land; at times, land owned by the state was released to landless people as well.
Sources : (1) Zaidi (2015) ; (2) Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (2020) ; (3) Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (2012b) ;
(4) Table 72, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (2012a) ; (5) Khan (2010) .
But  Martin’s  concern  with  broader  issues  goes  much  beyond  the  issue  of  land  reforms.  I
therefore discuss in the following sections the different building blocks of his argument, being
aware  that  such  a  brief  review  cannot  do  proper  justice  to  the  author’s  differentiated  and
empirically substantiated writing.
LANDED ELITES: ADAPTING TO ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGE
Classically, landlords derive their power from the control of land and labour. Workers depend
on  them  for  income  opportunities  through  tenancy,  sharecropping,  or  attached  agricultural
labour. Workers were dependent on the landowners’ patronage for a place to build their huts or
to  receive  credit  in  cases  of  emergencies.  These  relations  often  led  to  debt  bondage.  The
onslaught  of  green  revolution-induced  economic  modernisation  and  post-colonial
democratisation was seen by some researchers and policy-makers as liberating the oppressed
from  these  patron-client  dependencies.  Modernisation  would  provide  alternative  forms  of
employment (particularly through forward and backward linkages of agricultural production),
and  democracy  would  foster  mechanisms  of  accountability  (for  example,  by  means  of  local
governance).  Nicolas  Martin  questions  this  thesis  and  shows  how  dependencies  continue
unabated, though in different form.
The  modernisation  of  agriculture,  for  example,  helped  “middle  peasants”  join  the  ranks  of
landed elites by amassing land. Landed elites reduced their dependency on labour by means of
the increased use of tractors and combine harvesters for the cultivation of wheat. In addition,
many replaced wheat or cotton fields with orchards (especially citrus), which did not require
sharecroppers, but seasonal wage labour. Many tenants were evicted, which further added to the
creation of a “free” rural workforce that now depended on casual wage labour.
In principle, democratisation was expected to address such processes of economic change by
forcing the state to strengthen its capacities to care for its citizens – providing education that
equips one to find new employment, securing the rights of the workers under new labour market
arrangements, providing homesteads, providing access to credit, and so on. But Martin shows
how such expectations were blocked by the landed elite. They realised the crucial importance of
controlling land and labour, while also investing heavily in ways to control the local state.
Using the example of the village he studied, Martin documents how traditional big landlords,
having reduced the need to supervise labour, gradually moved to large cities to gain access to
education for their children, and to search for close contacts to the corridors of state power. This
allowed them to strategically position their closest kin in the state apparatus. In the village itself,
the middle peasants gradually took their place, and they too invested in the urban education of
their siblings. In addition, they used the platform of elections. The author meticulously followed
the Union Council elections of 2005, documenting the ways in which the local masses were
“bought,” how opponents were harassed, how ballot boxes and votes were manipulated on the
day of voting, and how campaign pledges dissolved.
In conceptualising elections, and politics for that matter, the author draws on Barth, and refers
to the process as a “zero-sum game where one person’s gain was another’s loss” (p. 103). Thus,
local elections became a battlefield between aspiring local elites. What is crucial to Martin is to
show that this battlefield is heavily influenced by the direct involvement of higher levels of the
state, especially the military. These are the levels that prevent real land reforms, that allow only
certain people and not others to contest elections (for example, by means of corruption charges),
and that allow ballot box rigging. It thus becomes essential for the landed elite to network with
these  higher  echelons.  These  are  costly  investments,  and  the  author  sees  parallels  to  India,
where research shows that the provision of “clientilistic goods” (p. 173) increases corruption.
Martin’s insights also throw new light on the assumed importance of biradari  (larger networks
of kinship) by showing that political  networking involves only the closest kin,  while further
choices  of  alliances  are  based on purely  instrumental  and strategic  decision-making beyond
kinship.
Those who succeed in capturing the local state are rewarded by having an almost free hand for
the “private appropriation of state resources” (p. 82). The elites capture the funds to build local
health centres (which are built  in poor quality and then used as chicken shacks),  or schools
(which  either  lack  teachers  or  house  employees  of  the  elites).  Beyond  that,  they  capture
contracts to build roads, control petrol stations, and so on.
THE POOR: PERPETUALLY DEPENDENT, THOUGH DIFFERENTLY
Nicolas Martin shows that forms of “traditional patronage” still exist (p. 51). Some people of
the village are household or farm servants of the landed elite (both “old” landlords and “new”
middle  peasants),  and  few  continue  as  tenants.  The  majority,  though,  have  become  wage
workers and depend on casual work. In the village studied, alternative forms of employment
were scarce, as urban centres were far away and too expensive for many labourers to stay. As a
consequence,  they  “joined  the  ranks  of  the  mass  of  unorganised  and  unprotected  workers”
(referring to Breman), a mass of free workers that now struggles to gain access to the limited
and often seasonal opportunities of wage labour offered by the landed elites. This struggle for
access  made  villagers  spend  “a  great  deal  of  time  trying  to  ingratiate  themselves  with  the
landlords, and some even went to the extent of snitching on each other to gain their favour” (p.
90).
This  helped to  reinforce  and reproduce elite  power  through “neo-bondage”  (p.  63,  following
Breman).  In addition, the elites continued practices of traditional patronage,  for example,  by
lending money, especially to their servants, who more often than not fell into debt bondage.
Many of the poor still depended on the elites for pieces of land on which to build their homes.
The failure of the homestead reforms programme (launched by Z.A. Bhutto in the early 1970s),
which was supposed to grant people legal ownership over their houses, is just another example
of the landed elites’ power to control the state’s efforts to reach the grassroots.
The fear of eviction is a powerful device to enforce subordination, and so is the prevention of
access to firewood or fodder. Other means to enforce subordination include muscle power and
threats (many landlords employed gunmen), linked with a strong influence over local police and
judiciary, which then become almost inaccessible to ordinary men and women. Threats are often
targeted  at  the  dependent’s  close  kin,  who  then  become  unwilling  accomplices  in  the
subordination. Muscle power was strengthened through drug trafficking and the spread of arms
as a consequence of the war in Afghanistan.
The prevention of  education is  another  practice  enforced by elites.  They rarely intervene to
rectify  the  widespread  problem  of  teacher  absenteeism.  However,  they  support  religious
education  of  the  conservative  type,  which  tends  to  explain  poverty  in  religious  terms,
encouraging the poor “to believe that worldly advancement would come to them from above
rather than through their labour and joint political action” (p. 166). On top of that, imageries of
tribe/caste differences continue to circulate, portraying the elites’ position as one of strength and
supported  by  religious  favour,  and  the  position  of  the  poor  as  self-inflicted,  the  result  of
incapability,  and of  being bad Muslims.  All  these elite  practices emerge from Martin’s  thick
description  of  village  politics  –  a  description  that  can  only  have  emerged  from months  of
observations of social relations on the ground.
SEARCHING FOR WAYS OUT OF INEQUALITY
The foregoing was my reading of this fascinating account of ground realities. Nicolas Martin’s
village  study  is  a  powerful  documentation  of  actual  everyday  politics,  and  allows  him  to
address,  with  empirically  grounded  evidence,  issues  in  ongoing  debates  on  the  production,
reproduction, and overcoming of inequality.
How far the insights gained in the case study village can be generalised across, say, northern
Punjab, and Pakistan more generally is, of course, a recurrent question. The author hints already
at the different political economies in southern Punjab and northern Sindh, where landowners’
power still depends on more traditional patronage. We await other studies that will inquire into
whether,  in  northern Punjab,  dependent  labour has  easier  access  to  alternative employment,
which  in  turn  may  allow  them  to  be  less  dependent  on  their  village  landed  elites.  Or
comparative studies that examine whether such processes of becoming more assertive are co-
opted  by  rival  factions  of  landed  elites.  Such  studies  may  provide  different  perspectives,
without, however questioning the book’s basic message of stark inequalities at the local level,
the powerful role of (landed) elites, and the skills of these elites in adapting their strategies in
order to reproduce their hold on power.
With these insights, Martin challenges (implicitly) all the policy-makers and practitioners who
imagine rural Pakistan as inhabited by “local communities” of “small farmers,” whose lives can
be  improved  through  “community  development”  based  on  CBOs  (community-based
organisations)  –  a  figment  of  the  imagination  that  is  specifically  attractive  to  international
development aid to this very day.
Martin  explicitly  challenges  the  explanation  of  the  role  of  local  elites  as  an  expression  of
“political society” (as used in the work of Partha Chatterjee). Of course, there are a few at the
grassroots who can benefit from the brokerage of state services by the local elites, and Martin
writes that the
lucky  one  on  the  “bright  side”  of  political  society  .  .  .  might  obtain  low  ranking
government jobs but did so in ways that undermined public service delivery . . .  .  In
other words, the dark side of political society was far more significant than its bright
side . . . . (p. 86)
Indeed, Martin shows convincingly that the masses continue to be captive to exploitative social
relations, and that very little trickles down through the almost impermeable filter of the local
elite. Therefore, in challenging established local social relations, “rights based movements and
solid democratic institutions deserve more credit for the expansion of civil and social rights . . .
than does political society . . . .” (p. 175).
But there is also a stark dilemma – that the sophisticated nexus of local elites and higher levels
of state and political parties is
forestalling the emergence of  the large scale political  movements,  or  even the rights
based movements,  that could have challenged the landed class and/or forced it  to be
accountable and to share more of the state resources that is appropriated for itself.” (p.
91)
I consider it a strength of the book that it ends with this clear formulation of the contemporary
dilemma characterising rural politics in this part of Pakistan (and most likely beyond), and that
it does not enter into further “recommendations” – propositions such as the urgent need for
horizontal class solidarity, or the need to increase working class mobilisation, or the need for
community  development.  I  argue  so  because  such  claims  would  just  amount  to  ideological
sloganeering that would be completely detached from the realm of the complex empirical so
convincingly laid out in the book.
This does not, however, imply that the search to overcome the dilemma outlined at the end of
the book should not be addressed. It needs to be addressed, so I argue, not through speculative
sloganeering, but through critical research. Such research needs to focus, through a critical but
ideologically “detached” approach, on concrete and everyday experiences with the opening or
closing of windows for democratic empowerment. In his book, Nicolas Martin actually hints at
entry points into such research. One is that the previous government of Asif Ali Zardari was the
first in the history of Pakistan that was able to complete its full term; thus, for example: why
was this possible? Another is that the media and civil  society gained more room for critical
expression under the same government.  However,  under the present regime of  Imran Khan,
these windows of opportunities are closing. Thus, for example: what are the very down-to-earth
conditions that allow or prevent more critical engagement? What did media and civil society
concretely do in practice to open windows of opportunities? In the surroundings of the village
studied, Martin finds a few instances where basic health units and schools “worked well, thanks
to the oversight of benevolent and paternalistic leaders.” And he concludes:
Further  research  would  however  be  necessary  to  establish  what  type  of  leadership
structures made it possible for leaders like these to resist close supporters trying to get
them to subvert state institutions on their behalf. (p. 92)
Linked  to  that:  Nicolas  Martin’s  thick  description  of  social  relations  at  the  village  level
highlights how the dependent rural masses are conditioned to search for improvements to their
situation  by  struggling  individually  (for  example,  by  seeking  personal  favours  from  their
patrons) and not by horizontally aligning with their peers to question the power of the landed
elite.  At  the  same  time,  though,  they  describe  these  landlords  as  being  “hard-hearted,”
exploitative,  and  bad  Muslims  (p.  163).  Thus,  for  example,  we  may  ask:  What  are  the
conditions under which the established common sense and its contradictions (with reference to
the critical perception of the elites by the poor) may foster horizontal solidarity?
Indeed, Nicolas Martin’s book is not only a thick description of real politics, but also serves as a
trigger for new and profoundly “policy-relevant” research.
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